Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Faculty Scholarship

2000

Why a Fundamental Right to a Quality Education Is Not Enough
James G. Wilson
Cleveland State University, j.wilson@csuohio.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Education Law Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Original Citation
James G. Wilson, Why a Fundamental Right to a Quality Education Is Not Enough, 34 Akron Law Review
383 (2000)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact research.services@law.csuohio.edu.

WHY A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A Q UALITY EDUCATION IS NOT ENOUGH
by
James Wilson*
No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to the
education of youth; for the neglect of education does harm to the constitution.
The citizen should be molded to suit the form of government under which he
lives.1
I. INTRODUCTION
This article relies upon the political and economic analysis of such great thinkers
as Aristotle and Rousseau to understand and normatively evaluate constitutional caselaw
in general and education cases in particular. The article’s title contains its conclusion: a
judicially created right to a quality education is a laudable, but possibly
counterproductive and definitely insufficient condition, for creating a humane
constitutional system. The rest of society needs to do far more to protect the average
citizen and worker from the ever-ravenous ruling class. All the edification in the world
will not mean much if there are only a few decent jobs available, jobs that promote
human dignity, a decent family life, a satisfactory income, and a sustainable economy
that does not wreck our biosphere.
Some progressives may initially bristle at the notion of applying economics to the
Constitution and to constitutional law. After all, the emergence of the “law and
economics” movement in the 1970s was symptomatic of the increasing ascendancy of the
“rule of capital” over the “rule of law.” Starting from Aristotle’s common-sense
*
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assumption that “The usefulness . . . depends upon its quantity even where there is no
difference in quality . . . just as a greater weight depresses the scale more,”2 these lawyers
claimed that their techniques improved foresight, thereby increasing the likelihood of a
society’s obtaining “a greater weight” of whatever preference it wanted. By merging the
self-evident goal of maximizing the overall benefits compared to costs with the technique
of reducing all questions to the common denominator of money, they elevated utility
above justice, pleasure and wealth above duty and happiness. They applied a variety of
formulas, ranging from the illuminating supply-demand curve to elaborate mathematical
models, thereby creating the impression (at least to themselves) that they were engaging
in a science instead of an art. But it was a “science” with a partisan political agenda.
Where Aristotle sought the best mixture of the “good and useful,”3 they wanted to
maximize “efficiency.” By making wealth accumulation the primary norm, they
accelerated the inherent tendency of capital to accumulate in relatively fewer hands.
Empowering capital by deregulation and increased mobility invariably comes at the cost
of labor, small business, stable communities, and the environment. 4
While these skillful analysts often revealed consequences that many had not seen
before, they usually ignored reasons for existing practices that did not satisfy the
preferences already imbedded in their economic imagery. For example, they used Judge
Learned Hand’s famous formula in tort law 5 to limit liability to those situations in which
the defendant’s economic costs to prevent the accident were less than the total amount of
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the costs of the injuries caused by the defendant’s existing actions or inactions. This
formulation eliminates one major reason why so many Federalists and Anti-Federalists
wanted to amend the proposed Constitution to protect their constitutional right to civil
jury trials. One of the functions of a jury in a republican government is to constrain the
rich and powerful by redistributing wealth to the weaker members of society. The
Framers understood that the wealthy tend to exploit their fellow citizens. Whenever this
exploitation becomes too brutal, juries could -- and would -- strike back. Anti-trust law
was an even more important target. Relying on abstract myths about market conditions
and functions, future judges such as Richard Posner and Robert Bork argued that market
size and domination should never be considered illegally “unreasonable” under the
Sherman Antitrust Act6 because some other competitor could always enter the market.
Thus, there were no legal limits to capital’s inherent tendency to consolidate and to
dominate governments, labor, the environment, and markets. The Anti- trust Act’s
original concerns about corporate abuses and private tyranny were dismissed as
misguided relics of an earlier era.
The maximization methodology can be extended to virtually every human
decision because “time is money” and people must “choose” between different mixtures
of “costs” and “benefits” to “maximize” their “preferences.” Although Posner went
through a stage when he apparently sought to reduce every normative issue to economic
analysis, 7 he eventually concluded that law and economics is best limited to the common
law areas (and Anti- trust), not traditional constitutional issues. Thus, at the very moment
when some combination of Madisonian Marxism and clever microeconomic theorizing
6
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would have revealed many insights into the predictable effects of various constitutional
doctrines on the distribution of wealth and power within the United States’ political
economy, Judge Posner adopted the far more amorphous concept of “pragmatism.” More
conservative counterparts, such as Justices Scalia and Thomas, publicly rely on such
abstractions as “text,” “history,” “tradition,” and “structure” to justify their constitutional
choices. They bizarrely claim they can better help run American society by not
considering the morality or the consequences of what they are doing. Admittedly, some
law and economics professors applied their microeconomic jargon to constitutional cases,
forcing the rest of us to try to remember the difference between “ex ante” and “ex post.”
However, such microeconomic analysis begged the most important constitutional
descriptive and normative question predating Aristotle: how are wealth and power
actually distributed in a particular society?
An economic approach combining the insight-generating tools of microeconomics
with the profoundly illuminating perceptions of Aristotelian-Marxist distributive
macroeconomics undermines the hoary belief that judges do not make “policy” based
upon foreseeable consequences but instead rely on “principles” plucked from text and
history. It reveals how frequently and profoundly the Constitution itself and the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of that document influence the perpetual struggle between the few
and the many. Macroeconomic analysis of constitutional law raises questions of
distributive justice, concerns that call into question the foreseeable effects of the
relentless use of microeconomics in private law and the expressed indifference to
economic consequences in constitutional law—the concentration of wealth and power in
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fewer hands at the expense of the middle class, the working poor, and the desperately
poor at home and abroad. Economic considerations drag the legal system into the dirty
worlds of money and politics, reducing any judicial claims to neutrality and autonomy.
For example, the 1974 Supreme Court’s creation in Buckley v. Valeo8 of free speech
rights facially favoring the wealthy by permitting them to spend as much money as they
wanted on themselves remains the most flagrant example of doctrinal class warfare. It is
not coincidental that soon after Buckley, both political parties quickly moved to the right
to raise more campaign money. Money has many attributes, but neutrality is not one of
them. History, Aristotelian theory, and modern economics all teach us that the rich will
collectively spend a large part of their discretionary wealth to make themselves richer.
The crude reductionism of the law and economics movement should not prevent us from
learning and applying some of the classical theories about political economy.
Focusing on the relationship of the written Constitution to the United States’
overall political economy also reveals some of the dangers in basing one’s system on the
assumption that improving individuals’ faculties through the maximization of wealth is
the ultimate end and everything else is a means to that end. Rather, our society should
perceive individual and human self-satisfaction -- ends that require a certain degree of
wealth to be realized -- as legitimate Kantian ends that must compete against other
compelling interests. The economist Herman Daly and the theologian John Cobb
described some of the grave distortions caused by the economic theory imbedded in our
civilization, Constitution, and constitutional doctrine:
Just as the absence of acknowledgment of community in economic theory
has led to the destruction of human community in economic practice, so
also the neglect of the physical world in economic theory has led to its
8

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976).

degradation in economic practice. We do not believe the reduction of
nature to matter as formless passivity or to a construct of the human mind
can be justified, and we doubt that anyone can live and think consistently
in those terms. 9

Quite simply, the interrelated threats of violent class war and environmental catastrophe
(not to mention the basic indecency of such practices) require that we redefine our
notions of constitutionalism to start dealing with these problems. We cannot wait for the
Constitution’s text to change, nor can we expect or even wish for the judiciary to be
primarily responsible for solving these difficult and enduring problems. Constitutional
lawyers need to take their useful techniques and powerful norms outside the courtroom.

II. EDUCATION, “FORMAL EQUALITY,” AND “EQUAL OPPORTUNITY”

Both Aristotle and Rousseau shed important light on the two underlying
conceptions of equality that have animated the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence in education cases: “formal equality” and “equal opportunity.” Because
such abstract analysis quickly becomes tedious when unsupported by specific examples,
this article shall first briefly review the Supreme Court’s fluctuations between these two
approaches.
The text of the United States Constitution does not contain the word “education.”
Consequently, humanitaria n judicial activists needed to rely upon the Constitution’s more
abstract passages. To strike down racist school systems in the states and in the District of
Columbia, the liberal justices of the Warren Court turned to the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and a creatively implied counterpart, the “equal protection
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component” of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. While Brown v. Board of
Education10 was such an important victory that it legitimated judicial review for the
entire twentieth century, it had an important omission. Chief Justice Warren could not
convince his colleagues that all children had a “fundamental right” to an education under
an “equal opportunity” interpretation of the equal protection mandates. Brown spoke
ambiguously, making education the focal point of subsequent judicial efforts to improve
society. However, the decision doctrinally limited its focus primarily to racial (and later
gender) issues, an emphasis that tended to elevate a conception of “formal equality”
hostile to racial and sexual categories above a notion of “equal opportunity” that would
provide a quality education for all.
The concept of “formal equality” seeks fairness by preventing governments from
using certain traits, notably race and gender, to disable individuals. Violations are fairly
easy to diagnose and remedy because the Court can delete virtually all statutory
references to any “suspect classifications.” The doctrine is also relatively inexpensive
because the Court does not require the state to provide any services; it merely prevents
the states from invidiously offering their pre-existing services. Thus the state can either
raise its services equally for all or reduce them equally for all. The equal opportunity
vision is more substantive. Its assumption that adequate education can solve our most
pressing social and political problems requires governments to spend a large amount of
money to educate every child living in America. But equal opportunity resembles formal
equality in its aversion to substantive outcomes. Both the Court’s and society’s
obligations to people radically diminish after they graduate from school and enter an
economic system dominated by private power and regulated at a constitutional level by a
10
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far less compassionate conception of formal equality. Under both approaches, the
judicial goal is to create a “level playing field” for subsequent class and individual
competition.
The two norms of racial and educational equality initially appeared to be
compatible, but soon came into conflict. Eliminating Southern apartheid and combating
more insidious forms of Northern school segregation immediately improved the quality
of education for many black and white children. The black children received more
resources under a far less stigmatic system, and some fortunate white children now were
educated with their fellow African-American citizens. One of the most important
educational molds for all Americans is learning the importance of overcoming with
tolerance and affection their grisly history of racial injustice and hostility. During this
optimistic period, it seemed as if the federal judiciary, often supported by the other two
branches, could create a meaningful right to “equal opportunity” through equal education
of the races. Everyone knew that improving the conditions of blacks would improve life
for many poor people because so many of the impoverished were African-American.
Tragically, the federal judiciary’s focus on race frequently came at the expense of
class-based concerns. Instead of requiring a high-quality education for everyone—
something that could be partially measured through such basic techniques as class size,
teacher payrolls, types of classes, and classroom support—the Court made desegregatio n
its immediate goal and school busing its primary remedy. 11 The consequences were easy
to foresee, whether one uses economic tools or not—the burden of curing urban school
segregation fell upon both the black and white working classes who inhabited the inner
cities, which had a long history of racism since they were the places where the races

commingled. Neighborhood schools disappeared, isolating black and white parents from
the one public institution that helped their families the most. Many whites and middleclass blacks fled the steadily declining public school systems by sending their children to
parochial schools or by moving to nearby suburbs. The racially focused remedies
reinforced the blacks’ understandable sense of racial injustice, exacerbating the
destructive conclusion of many that they should not actively participate in the educational
system for fear of becoming an “Uncle Tom.” The white working class reacted with
rage; a rage admittedly influenced by racism, but also by a correct foreboding that
liberals and conservatives alike would consistently downplay their interests in the future.
For many millions, judicial conceptions of “formal equality” and “equal educational
opportunity for all” meant increased racial polarization and political disempowerment
over their children’s education.
The liberal justices should not be blamed for all the subsequent disasters that have
left many inner city public schools in a state of chaos. In part, because the liberal Justices
angered so many white working class voters who had previously voted for the
Democratic Party, the liberals soon were outnumbered by far more conservative
colleagues who were uninterested in either racial or economic justice. In Milliken v.
Bradley, the conservatives limited the divisive, counterproductive remedy of busing to
the inner cities that initially faced racial problems, leaving the allegedly innocent suburbs
free from any constitutional obligations. 12 Although many progressives have attacked
this opinion, it may have been the best result for the more humane wing of the
Democratic Party. Imagine the political backlash if inner-city students had been bussed
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throughout the suburbs. It is very likely that many inner ring suburbs would have quickly
let their school systems deteriorate through yet another wave of privatization and class
flight.
As part of their agenda to stop the liberals from interpreting the Constitution to
protect the poor, the conservatives decided, in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
that the states could continue to have school districts that spent significantly different
amounts depending upon their tax base. 13 Just as the Plessy Court had put on blinders to
deny the racial impact of segregated trains, 14 the Rodriguez Court claimed that the poor
and working class were not being discriminated against because not every member of an
impoverished school district would be poor. 15 Under this conception of “formal
equality,” the Constitution’s concerns about education diminished once state officials
stopped using race as a factor.
In Plyler v. Doe, Justice Powell, who had cast the swing vote in Rodriguez,
created a limited judicial conception of “equal opportunity.”16 States could not
“absolutely deny” a child an education, even though they could continue to provide lousy
learning experiences. Thus, something like Warren’s equal opportunity “fundamental
right to an education” became part of the doctrine. This test was judicially manageable
because it would be easy for plaintiffs to prove “complete deprivation.” It kept the Court
from determining the proper way to run and finance schools. But even this grudging,
limited right has been undermined; in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, the Supreme
Court held that a State could, in effect, “completely deprive” a poor child of a public
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education by charging that child’s parents with busing fees. 17 Apparently there is nothing
in the Constitution to prevent the states from precluding the poor by transferring massive
costs to them. In a few states -- including Ohio -- state courts have attempted, with
varying degrees of success, to impose more egalitarian educational systems through their
interpretation of state constitutions. Subsequent popular outrage and political resistance
indicate that courts will rarely have the authority or capacity to adequately correct this
continuing constitutional outrage. Nor did Congress ever seriously intervene to provide
funds to equalize educational opportunities. American justices and politicians talk of
“the land of opportunity,” but they implement an educational system that exacerbates the
different levels of opportunity actually available for the different classes.
What is to be learned by this agonizing tale, a mixture of dazzling judicial
triumphs, most notably the desegregation of Southern public schools, judicial
overreaching through the remedy of busing, and judicial and legislative callousness
toward the continuing plight of minority, poor, and working-class families? The most
obvious solution for ambitious constitutional lawyers is to propose a judicially created
“equal right to a quality education for all” that is indifferent to modes of taxation and
funding. Such a right would diminish the importance of race and regain the allegiance of
many white and black voters who want more control over local schools. But there are
serious problems with such a doctrine. Under our representative system of government,
the legislative branch is primarily responsible for raising the taxes to provide
governmental services. Courts are ill- fitted to run educational institutions. How can a
judge determine, as a matter of constitutional law, what is the right mixture of
administrators and teachers, construction projects and special education classes? A
17
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judicially mandated quality education would raise taxes while threatening the suburban
status quo by requiring the wealthy suburbanites to pay more for less. The backlash
could strengthen political conservatism for decades. Most importantly, there is little
reason to believe that such a right, whether enforced by the federal courts or subsidized
by Congress, will be sufficient to create a stable, humane society because both “formal
equality” and “equal opportunity” fail to address basic constitutional problems.

III. ARISTOTLE, AGRARIAN LAWS, AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
The flaw with the above story, like most other constitutional law textbooks and
articles, is that it is excessively court- focused. 18 When most American lawyers and
citizens think of the word “Constitution,” they immediately envision an ancient, unique
document supported by volumes of legal decisions and interpretations. Aristotle provides
us with several different conceptions of constitutionality that permit us to escape this
murky, unsatisfying story. The most important has already been discussed: a country’s
“constitution” consists of its distribution of wealth and power between the many, the few,
and the one (if there is a monarchy or tyranny). 19 Aristotle thus anticipated Madison’s
concerns about civil conflicts over the distribution of property and Marx’s anger at the
capitalists’ systemic exploitation of labor. Under Aristotle’s definition, constitutional
lawyers and analysts need to look far beyond the Court and its opinions both to
understand their particular system and to solve its problems. The legislative branches of
Congress and the Presidency become crucial parts of any worthwhile, viable
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constitutional vision. Lawyers need to take their social engineering skills, their capacity
to design constitutional doctrine to solve basic social problems, and apply them to issues
that will be primarily resolved by Congress and the President. For instance, it is hard to
imagine that the Courts could ever single- handedly create and enforce a “right to a
quality education.” Looking beyond judicial doctrine also enables us to make
constitutional arguments to institutions like Congress that have rarely been seen as the
repository of important Constitutional rights. These more overtly political arguments
reveal additional reasons for a quality education; reasons that might persuade a more
humane Court to act at the margins.
The big difference between Aristotle and most contemporary constitutional legal
theorists is that Aristotle feared both the rich and the poor. As a group, the rich grow up
pampered, unsympathetic to democratic norms. They sense, quite rightly, that internal
democracy is the greatest threat to their wealth. Their greed knows no limits; they are
willing to drive the masses into poverty to gain additional wealth. Aside from massive
poverty’s inherent immorality caused by the widespread destruction of individual
happiness, severe wealth disparity increases the risk of revolution. The people will either
try to overthrow the powerful or they will turn to a demagogue purporting to represent
them against their rapacious superiors. In America, public power is always questioned,
but the legitimacy of private power is rarely considered a constitutional issue. The
American Constitution aggravates this problem by explicitly limiting private power only
once, outlawing slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment. Thus, traditional
constitutional analysis continually questions the “legitimacy” of judicial review and the

threat of “majoritarian tyranny,” but rarely worries about the “legitimacy” of the rich and
the dangers of “private tyranny.”
Aristotle harshly proposed that constitutional democracies exile 20 the excessively
rich to guarantee the triumph of the relatively stable middle class over the rich and poor:
“[W]here the middle class is large, there are least likely to be factions and dissensions.”21
Aristotle also sought to provide public assistance to those less fortunate citizens so they
would not plunge into alienating poverty. For example, the city could pay them to be
jurors. Overall, Aristotle proposed a political economy shaped like a trapezoid: the state
would eliminate the wealthiest members, while raising the poorest section to a tolerable
level. Toward the end of the Roman Republic, the Gracchi brothers implemented an
alternative means to reaching a trapezoidal system that does not turn the rich into a
coalition of dangerous martyrs living at home and exiled abroad, eager to use their wealth
to strike back at the system that threatens them. Under the “agrarian laws,” the state took
the extensive lands of the wealthy and distributed them to the poor so they could make a
living. A similar system could be created in the United States by reestablishing high
marginal income tax rates on the wealthy, eliminating most tax exemptions for the
wealthy, and increasing taxes on their personal and intangible property. Most
importantly, the system should severely tax intergenerational wealth transfers to prevent
the rise of a hereditary aristocracy.
But what support can be given the poor that would be the equivalent of excessive
lands redistributed to Roman citizens? Two of the major purposes of the agrarian laws
were to make the poor economically self-sufficient and politically committed to their
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society. Thus, any modern alternative should seek the same goals. At the least, every
American child ought to have a constitutional right to enough basic resources (such as
food, clothing, housing, and health care) and a quality education so that he or she can
make a good living in this primarily nonagrarian society. However, agrarian laws take us
far beyond “equal opportunity.” So long as people are willing and able to work (which
includes the raising of children), the government should provide them with decent jobs.
No matter what happens to particular individuals, we should not let the poor live in
hopeless squalor.

The agrarian analogy can be more specific. Assuming that Herman

Daly and John Cobb are correct in arguing that family farms have more lo ng-run viability
than federally supported corporate farming, our government should limit farms to a
certain size and to individual families, creating numerous new opportunities for hardworking families.

IV. ROUSSEAU AND FORMAL EQUALITY
The more conservative members of the current Supreme Court generally rely on
“formal equality” to resolve most “equal protection” issues, including those surrounding
education. The most pressing and immediate example is the affirmative action
controversy, which pits the conservatives’ hatred of racial categories against the more
moderate members’ acknowledgment of the continuing, tragic need to use race as a
benign factor. Historically, the Lochner era represented the high- water mark of formal
equality by attempting to constitutionalize the formal equality permeating the common

law. 22 Under that theory, redistributive purposes (at least to benefit labor) could never
be part of a government’s agenda.
Because of formal equality’s champions and its claimed indifference to
substantive outcomes, some leftists will be tempted to jettison the doctrine completely as
yet another example of legalistic obfuscation and oppression. But as is usually the case,
such global dismissals of modes of legal reasoning throw out much of value. The formal
egalitarians are following Chief Justice Marshall’s approach in McCulloch v. Maryland 23
of preventing injustice by insuring that the burdens or benefits of a law fall equally on all
those affected. Marshall held that the states could not tax federal bank “operations,” but
could tax federal real property because the states would have an incentive to overtax the
federal banks’ operations to make a profit and destroy a rival, 24 but they would not want
to raise general property taxes to a high le vel since that would hurt their own citizenry
far more than the bank. In other words, a proper definition of “formal equality” limits a
majority’s capacity to oppress a minority because it cannot single out that minority. Any
legal disabilities must be distributed equally. Thus, Brown was correctly decided under a
humanitarian conception of formal equality in that it held that states could not segregate
black and white students. The use of race for malicious reasons, like the special tax on
the federal bank, was dangerously and temptingly specific. Although formal equality
cannot solve many constitutional problems, it winnows out many oppressive forms of
governmental action. For another example, the First Amendment doctrine of “viewpoint
neutrality” precludes governments from “suppressing” a particular political viewpoint.
22
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Although the application of that doctrine will remain controversial in the details, it is a
good thing that governments cannot totally prevent American citizens from fully
expressing their political beliefs.
This endorsement of formal equality remains half- hearted because Rousseau has
explained how formal equality contains its own political economy, one that
conservatives find inherently congenial. Like Aristotle, Rousseau feared the “tyranny of
the rich.”25 Rousseau wanted the state to deprive individuals of the opportunity of
becoming rich instead of stripping them of their preexisting wealth. Rousseau’s “equal
opportunity” did not include the possibility of great wealth. In his Second Discourse,
Rousseau describes the formation of a social contract in terms far different and far more
illuminating than Locke’s generally reasonable men and Hobbe’s frightened, violent
masses. 26
Although Rousseau never used the term “noble savage,” the phrase captures his
romantic beliefs about unspoiled, uncivilized human nature. Fortunately, one does not
have to either accept or deny this idealized state to appreciate the power and relevance of
his subsequent anthropological description of the changes in social relationships. At
first, ignorant humans crowded together in tribes like monkeys and crows. 27 But their
powerful minds slowly created language, which enabled them to foresee events more
clearly. With increased foresight, they could deve lop industry, leading to crude
conceptions of property regulated by force. The human heart became more generous
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once it formed into social units called families. But such progress exacted its costs;
humans invented new things which quickly “degenerated into true needs.”28 Slowly,
these families formed tribes and nations. Although each person had the power to
determine his or her rights, the social order was the “best for man” because it was neither
so primitive nor so brutally sophisticated. Tragically, cooperation led to tyranny:

[B]ut the moment one man needed the help of another; as soon as it was
found to be useful for one to have provisions for two, equality
disappeared, property disappeared, work became necessary, and the vast
forests changed into smiling fields that had to be watered with the sweat of
men, and where slavery and misery were soon seen to sprout and grow
together with the harvests. 29

Inevitably, those who were more ingenious, harder working, more skillful, or more
fortunate would prevail over their fellow citizens. Soon, a new class of men emerged
from this process: “[t]he rich, for their part, had scarcely become acquainted with the
pleasure of dominating than they disdained all other pleasures, and using their old Slaves
to subject new ones.”30 But the poor fought back: “[t]he breakdown of equality was
followed by the most frightful disorder: thus the usurpations of the rich, and the Banditry
of the Poor, and the unbridled passions of all, stifling natural pity and the still weak
voice of justice, made men greedy, ambitious, and wicked.”31 The rich quickly
recognized that they had more to lose through such a violent version of class war. By
emphasizing existing excesses, the rich brilliantly persuaded the majority to adopt a
system of formal equality:

28
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Let us united to protect the weak from oppression, restrain the ambitious,
and secure for everyone the possession of what belongs to him: Let us
institute rules of Justice and peace to which all are obliged to conform,
which favor no one, and which in a way make up for the vagaries of
fortune by subjecting the powerful and weak alike to mutual duties. In a
word, instead of turning our forces against one another, let us gather them
into a supreme power that might govern us according to wise Laws . . . . 32

Rousseau believed this argument was “specious” because it entrenched the power
of the already powerful and guaranteed the triumph of future elites. Nevertheless, the
poor accepted the contract because they sensed that this was the best deal they could get.
When a person or a group has unequal bargaining power, formal equality is a huge step
forward from oppression. Admittedly, the powerful had to give up some rights, but they
now had the formal rule of law to protect them as they continued their plundering ways:
Such was, or must have been, the origin of Society and of Laws, which
gave the weak new fetters, and the rich new forces, irreversibly destroyed
natural freedom, forever fixed the Law of property and inequality,
transformed a skillful usurpation into an irrevocable right, and for the
profit of a few ambitious men henceforth subjugated the whole of
Mankind to labor, servitude and misery. 33

This chilling anthropology is worth reviewing because it seems more accurate
than the story of a group of equals making social contracts through majoritarian
procedures. But even if fails to accurately describe mankind’s original transition into
lawful tyranny, it predicts, to a remarkable degree, the formation of the United States
Constitution. One of the Framers’ major concerns at the Constitutional Convention was
to provide as little democracy as possible to the people, although they knew that they
needed the people’s support to implement their program. For instance, the delegates
reluctantly conceded that there should not be any property qualifications for
32
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Congressional members. To persuade reluctant Americans to adopt the new
Constitution, these men pointed to threats from both ends of the spectrum. The Shays
Revolution and Rhode Island pro-debtor legislation demonstrated the problems with too
much democracy. But the seditious rumblings within the Society of Cinncinatius were
equally grim reminders of how the wealthy might respond if their needs were not met.
To a large degree, the Constitution represented a deal between the few and the many.
The “many” would be allowed to elect directly one-sixth of the government, the House
of Representatives. An agrarian precapitalist, Madison also hoped that the rich would
never become so rich that they would destroy the necessary virtue of the Aristotlean
yeoman farmer. Influenced by Malthus, Madison feared that one day the rich would
dominate the republic through clever manipulation of the poor. Historical experience
has partially validated Rousseau’s and Madison’s dire predictions. Formal equality
simultaneously protects every productive person while allowing the rich to manipulate
the legal system to increase their power over the citizenry. While various conceptions of
“merit” may define aristocracies for some time, Rousseau explained how wealth
becomes the predominate factor: “[B]eing the most immediately useful to well-being and
the easiest to transmit, it can readily be used to buy all the rest.”34
More enlightened thinkers like Jefferson and Madison were not completely
committed to formal equality and the eventual triumph of the wealthy. Education would
be available to all regardless of income so that everyone could have the opportunity to
compete. Eliminating the doctrine of primogeniture would prevent wealth from
accumulating in too few hereditary hands. State laws, enforced by juries, were the parts
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of the constitutional system that would redistribute the wealth to maintain basic
economic equality so necessary for a republic’s moral health and stability. This analysis
demonstrates why some part of our constitutional system must proceed beyond formal
equality to prevent a class subordination that Rousseau believes will eventually lead to
slavery. It also shows why we can only expect so much from the judiciary. The issue is
too vast and important to be left to the vagaries of constitutional lawyering through the
awkward tool of judicial review. Because the judiciary cannot effectively solve most of
our most pressing constitutional questions, we need to separate many of the judiciary’s
findings of constitutionality – conclusions that are often based upon reasonable beliefs
about judicial competence and judicial role – from the understandable impression that
those issues have thus become immune from further constitutional inquiry. Although
many American lawyers may not like it, we need to utilize frequently the English
argument that many governmental actions can be “unconstitutional” without necessarily
being illegal. 35

V. SCHOOL VOUCHERS : A CASE STUDY IN PRIVATE POWER, EDUCATION, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW

If one believes that private power, manifested through concentrated individual
wealth and corporate institutions, is a great threat to our constitutional republic, how
much should and could that belief affect constitutional law concerning education? I shall
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explore that question by applying it to the issue of publicly financed vouchers for
nonpublic education. One answer is that the proposition is judicially irrelevant; Supreme
Court justices should keep their economic preferences out of constitutional doctrine. But
that default rule has at least two costs. It tends to drive the Court toward formal equality,
which has its own set of economic biases, and it leaves more humanitarian justices unable
to counterattack against the current conservative justices’ eagerness to constitutionalize
their economic vision through such areas as federalism and the First Amendment. The
Court should create doctrine that protects public education from private power in much
the same way that it presently separates church and state.
Advocates of judicial restraint would reply that it is much better to make such
constitutional arguments to the legislative branches. Courts cannot build a coherent
“wall” separating public and private power. It surely must be permissible for schools to
hire private contractors and private sellers of textbooks. Must federal courts ban CocaCola machines in the same way they preclude the posting of the Ten Commandments?
Given the existing doctrinal chaos surrounding church and state issues in terms of
supporting parochial schools, it is easy to foresee even more arbitrary outcomes if some
members of the Court aggressively implemented this new agenda (even if they kept their
motives sub rosa by following their conservative colleagues’ example of dressing up
their economic beliefs as First Amendment, separation-of-church-and-state issues).
The crucial constitutional issue of how to mold our children through education to
create a better society needs to be fought primarily in the political arena. The legal
doctrine concerning church and state can provide some guidance to subsequent political
debate. There should be no advertisements in school, just as there are no crucifixes. The

students’ textbooks should not contain math questions such as the following: “Joey wants
to buy two pairs of Nike shoes. Each pair costs $138. The onerous state tax is seven per
cent. How much must he pay?” On the other hand, the following question would be
acceptable in a social studies book: “Each pair of Nike shoes costs $138. Nike paid each
Indonesian fifty cents for making a pair of those shoes. What percentage of the
consumer’s cost goes to the actual producer?” After all, that question explores the role of
corporate capitalism in our society, just as public schools can and should teach about the
influence of religions on society. Any use of modern media should not contain
advertising. Perhaps public schools could build their own websites and basic search
machines so that students do not have to be pummeled with advertising while they learn
how to use the Internet.
But judicial restraint does not necessarily mean complete judicial withdrawal.
Whatever one thinks about school vouchers, the fact that they will potentially increase
private power’s direct influence over the education of millions of students provides
another good reason to oppose them. We can be sure that the enlightened educational
corporations will be championing the virtues of unlimited profit through the
manipulation of state power and revenues. But there are also good political and
economic arguments in favor of vouchers. Some will argue that public schools have
already improperly indoctrinated their students into passivity, blind consumerism, and
conformity. Progressive private schools might better “mold” citizens than the current
system. Those who seek diversity will assert that a wide range of private schools will
allow parents and communities to create a wide range of alternatives reflecting their own
cultures. One of the best ways to give poor children a good education may be to make

them economically valuable through the voucher system. One of the arguments against
the status quo, particularly in urban schools, is that they are not doing a good job. Then
there is the problem of judicial competence and judicial role: rigid constitutional doctrine
should not be used to prevent a potentially valuable experiment in educational reform.
Law review articles conventionally end with a confident conclusion. But this
article prefers to conclude with a whiff of uncertainty, if only to demonstrate how general
propositions and multiple arguments cannot resolve particular issues. I really do not
know how I would decide the school voucher cases if I sat on the bench. But I guarantee
that the above economic considerations would reinforce my wavering inclination to find
vouchers to be an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of church and
state.

